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12.1 Introduction
One of the most striking labor force phenomena of the second half of the
twentieth century in the United States has been the rapid decline in the la-
bor force participation rate of older men. In 1950, for example, 81 percent
of sixty-two-year-old men were in the labor force; by 1995, this ﬁgure had
fallen to 51 percent, although it has rebounded slightly in the past few
years (Quinn 1999). Over the same period, the labor force participation
rate of older women has risen dramatically, as shown in ﬁgure 12.1, due in
large part to changing roles and opportunities for women during the pe-
riod.
Much has been written about the proximate causes of the decline in
older men’s labor force participation and, in particular, about the role of
the Social Security (SS) program. A large number of articles have docu-
mented pronounced “spikes” in retirement at ages sixty-two and sixty-ﬁve,
which correspond to the early and normal retirement ages for SS, respec-
tively. While there are some other explanations for a spike at age sixty-ﬁve,
such as entitlement for health insurance under the Medicare program or
rounding error in surveys, there is little reason to see a spike at sixty-two as
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8attributable to anything other than the SS program. Indeed, as Burtless
and Moﬃtt (1984) document, this spike at age sixty-two only emerged af-
ter the early retirement eligibility age for men was introduced in 1961.
The presence of these strong patterns in retirement data suggest that the
underlying structure of SS plays a critical role in determining retirement
decisions, but the impact of increases in SS generosity on retirement deci-
sions is less obvious. A large body of literature dating from the mid-1970s
has investigated this relationship, and the broad conclusion of that litera-
ture is that the level of SS beneﬁts has a signiﬁcant, but modest, eﬀect on
retirement dates. However, much of this literature either relies on data that
are now decades old or otherwise ﬂawed or it suﬀers from methodological
problems.
The purpose of our paper is to revisit the impact of SS on retirement, tak-
ing advantage of newly available data on retirement behavior and method-
ological advances in retirement modeling over the past decade. Our data
set, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), follows a sample of near-
retirement-age individuals starting in 1992 and contains detailed informa-
tion on demographic and job characteristics, labor force attachment, earn-
ings histories, health, and private pensions.
Our empirical analysis relies on the important observation of Stock and
Wise (1990a,b) that it is not simply the level of retirement wealth or the in-
crement with one additional year of work that matters, but the entire evo-
lution of future wealth with further work. Their “option value” model
posited retirement decisions as a function of the diﬀerence between the
utility of retirement at the current date and at the date that maximizes one’s
utility. We use this model in a reduced-form context, as well as an alterna-
tive forward-looking measure called “peak value,” introduced in Coile and
Gruber (2001) and described in more detail below.
We have two major ﬁndings. First, retirement appears to respond much
more to SS incentive variables deﬁned with reference to the entire future
stream of retirement incentives than to the accrual in retirement wealth
over the next year alone, indicating that it is important to include forward-
looking measures such as peak value or option value in retirement models.
These forward-looking measures have a signiﬁcant impact on retirement
decisions for men, although for women only the option value model gen-
erates a signiﬁcant result. Second, we conduct simulations of the eﬀect of
two possible policy changes—raising the early and normal retirement ages
by three years or moving to a system with a ﬂat beneﬁt of 60 percent of
earnings—and ﬁnd that these policy changes could have signiﬁcant eﬀects
on retirement behavior.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 12.2, we brieﬂy discuss the rel-
evant institutional features of the SS system in the United States and pro-
vide an overview of the previous literature in this area. In section 12.3, we
describe our data and incentive variable calculations. In section 12.4, we
The Eﬀect of Social Security on Retirement in the United States 693describe the empirical framework for our regression analysis and present
the results of our estimation. In section 12.5, we conduct a series of simu-
lation exercises to assess the impact of SS reform using our model, and we
present our conclusions in section 12.6.
12.2 Background
12.2.1 Institutional Features of Social Security
The SS system is ﬁnanced by a payroll tax that is levied equally on work-
ers and ﬁrms. The total payroll tax paid by each party is 7.65 percentage
points; 5.3 percentage points are devoted to the Old Age and Survivors In-
surance (OASI) program, with 0.9 percentage points funding the Disabil-
ity Insurance (DI) system and 1.45 percentage points funding Medicare’s
Hospital Insurance (HI) program. The payroll tax that funds OASI and DI
is levied on earnings up to the taxable maximum, $76,200 in 2000; the HI
tax is uncapped.
Individuals qualify for an OASI pension by working for forty quarters in
covered employment, which now encompasses most sectors of the econ-
omy. Beneﬁts are determined in several steps. The ﬁrst step is computation
of the worker’s averaged indexed monthly earnings (AIME), which is one-
twelfth of the average of the worker’s annual earnings in covered employ-
ment, indexed by a national wage index. Importantly, additional higher-
earnings years can replace earlier lower-earnings years, since only the
highest thirty-ﬁve years of earnings are used in the calculation.1
The next step is to convert the AIME into the primary insurance amount
(PIA). This is done by applying a three-piece linear progressive schedule
to an individual’s average earnings, whereby 90 cents of the ﬁrst dollar of
earnings is converted to beneﬁts, while only 15 cents of the last dollar of
earnings (up to the taxable maximum) is so converted. As a result, the rate
at which SS replaces past earnings (the “replacement rate”) falls with the
level of lifetime earnings.
The ﬁnal step is to adjust the PIA based on the age at which beneﬁts are
ﬁrst claimed. For workers commencing beneﬁt receipt at the normal re-
tirement age (NRA; legislated to rise slowly from age sixty-ﬁve to sixty-
seven over the next twenty years), the monthly beneﬁt is the PIA. For work-
ers claiming before the NRA, beneﬁts are decreased by an actuarial
reduction factor of ﬁve-ninths of one percent per month; thus, a worker
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1. While earnings through age ﬁfty-nine are converted to real dollars for averaging, earn-
ings after age sixty are treated nominally. There is a two-year lag in availability of the wage in-
dex, calling for a base in the year in which the worker turns sixty in order to be able to com-
pute beneﬁts for workers retiring at their sixty-second birthdays. This implies particularly
large eﬀects of this dropout-year provision for earnings near the age of retirement, particu-
larly in high-inﬂation environments.with an NRA of age sixty-ﬁve claiming on his sixty-second birthday re-
ceives 80 percent of the PIA.2Individuals can also delay the receipt of ben-
eﬁts beyond the NRA and receive a delayed retirement credit (DRC). For
workers reaching age sixty-ﬁve in 2000, an additional 6 percent is paid for
each year of delay; this amount will steadily increase until it reaches 8 per-
cent per year in 2008.
While a worker may claim as early as age sixty-two, receipt of SS bene-
ﬁts is conditioned on the earnings test until the worker reaches age sixty-
ﬁve.3 A worker age sixty-two to sixty-ﬁve may earn up to $9,600 in 1999
without the loss of beneﬁts, then beneﬁts are reduced $1 for each $2 of
earnings above this amount. Months of beneﬁts lost through the earnings
test are treated as delayed receipt, entitling the worker to a DRC on the lost
beneﬁts when he resumes full-beneﬁt receipt.
One of the most important features of SS is that it also provides beneﬁts
to dependents of covered workers. Spouses receive a beneﬁt equal to 50 per-
cent of the worker’s PIA, which is available once the worker has claimed
beneﬁts and the spouse has reached age sixty-two; however, the spouse only
receives the larger of this and their own entitlement as a worker.4 Depen-
dent children are also each eligible for 50 percent of the PIA, but the total
family beneﬁt cannot exceed a maximum that is roughly 175 percent of the
PIA. Surviving spouses receive 100 percent of the PIA, beginning at age
sixty, although there is an actuarial reduction for claiming beneﬁts before
age sixty-ﬁve or if the worker had an actuarial reduction. Finally, beneﬁt
payments are adjusted for increases in the consumer price index (CPI) af-
ter the worker has reached age sixty-two; thus, SS provides a real annuity.
12.2.2 Labor Market Participation and Program Participation
Table 12.1 documents the transition of men and women out of the labor
force and into receipt of SS and other beneﬁts. At ages ﬁfty to ﬁfty-four, 81
percent of men are working full time, 4 percent are working part time, and
15 percent are not working. The fraction of men in this age group receiving
some type of beneﬁt is about equal to the fraction not working and is di-
vided roughly equally among those receiving DI beneﬁts (6 percent), Un-
employment Insurance (UI) beneﬁts (5 percent), and private pensions (5
percent).5 At ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to ﬁfty-nine, an additional 11 percent of men
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2. The reduction factor will be only ﬁve-twelfths of one percent for months beyond thirty-
six months before the NRA, which is relevant for workers with an NRA past age sixty-ﬁve.
3. Until 2000, workers aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine were subject to an earnings test with a
higher earnings ﬂoor and lower tax rate than that for workers aged sixty-two to sixty-ﬁve.
However, the Senior Citizens’ Freedom to Work Act of 2000 eliminated the earnings test for
persons aged sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine as of January 2000.
4. Spousal beneﬁts can begin earlier if there is a dependent child in the household; spousal
beneﬁts are also subject to actuarial reduction if receipt commences before the spouse’s NRA.
5. In addition, 2 percent of men are receiving supplemental security income (SSI), a means-
tested beneﬁt for people who are poor and either disabled or aged sixty-ﬁve or older.leave the labor force, and there is a concurrent rise in the fraction receiving
DI (to 9 percent) and private pensions (to 13 percent). At ages sixty to sixty-
four, there is a large movement out of the full-time labor market (down to
45 percent) and on to SS (27 percent) and private pensions (27 percent), and
to a lesser extent, DI (13 percent). By ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine, the vast
majority of workers have moved out of the full-time labor market (down to
15 percent) and on to SS (86 percent) and often private pensions (45 per-
cent).6 In short, the U.S. system features one main pathway to retirement,
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Table 12.1 Labor Market Participation and Program Participation, 1997 (%)
Age
50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70–74
Labor Market Participation
Men
Working full time 81.2 69.8 44.6 14.8 7.1
Working part time 3.5 5.2 8.3 10.5 8.3
Not working 15.2 25.0 47.1 74.7 84.6
Women
Working full time 57.4 48.2 27.5 8.6 2.6
Working part time 13.6 12.8 12.1 10.0 6.5
Not working 29.0 39.0 60.4 81.5 90.9
Program Participation
Men who received
SS retired worker beneﬁts 0.0 0.0 26.9 85.9 95.3
SS dependent spouse beneﬁt 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2
SS survivor’s beneﬁts 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1
DI beneﬁts 5.7 9.0 12.9 0.0 0.0
SSI beneﬁts 2.1 2.7 3.1 4.0 4.1
UI beneﬁts 5.1 3.8 3.4 1.0 0.2
Private pension beneﬁts 4.8 13.2 27.4 45.2 48.5
Women who received
SS retired worker beneﬁts 0.0 0.0 21.3 57.5 61.3
SS dependent spouse beneﬁt 0.3 0.3 7.0 15.9 15.8
SS survivor’s beneﬁts 0.6 1.4 10.6 14.2 18.3
DI beneﬁts 4.0 5.9 7.4 0.0 0.0
SSI beneﬁts 3.4 4.3 5.2 6.9 7.6
UI beneﬁts 2.7 2.5 1.6 0.7 0.3
Private pension beneﬁts 2.2 5.3 12.4 20.9 24.6
Sources: Population ﬁgures are from table 14 of the 1998 Statistical Abstract of the United
States (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1998) and from the Bureau of Census website (available at
http://www.census.gov/population/estimates/nation/intﬁle2-1.txt). The SS, DI, and SSI ben-
eﬁt ﬁgures are from tables 5.A1 and 7.E3 of the 1998 Annual Statistical Supplement to the So-
cial Security Bulletin (Social Security Administration 1998). Labor force participation, UI
beneﬁts, and private-pension beneﬁts are authors’ calculations from the March 1998 Current
Population Survey.
6. Receipt of DI beneﬁts goes to zero at age sixty-ﬁve, as DI recipients are automatically
transferred to SS beneﬁt receipt at age sixty-ﬁve.from full-time work to receipt of SS (and frequently private pension bene-
ﬁts), a move that typically occurs between ages sixty-two and sixty-ﬁve.
This is in contrast to many other developed countries, where many people
exit the labor force at earlier ages and receive UI or DI beneﬁts prior to be-
coming eligible for retirement beneﬁts. As use of these other paths to retire-
ment is minimal in the United States, they will not factor into our analysis.
For women, the patterns are similar but with a few notable diﬀerences.
First, a lower fraction of women are initially working full time at ages ﬁfty
to ﬁfty-four (57 percent); this reﬂects both a higher fraction of women out
of the labor force entirely (29 percent) and a higher fraction working part
time (14 percent). Second, while many women receive SS beneﬁts based on
their own work record (58 percent of women at ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-
nine), a signiﬁcant fraction receive beneﬁts only as a result of being a de-
pendent spouse (16 percent) or widow (14 percent). Third, fewer women
receive private pension beneﬁts (21 percent at ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-nine,
versus 45 percent of men).
12.2.3 Previous Related Literature
A number of studies have used aggregate information on the labor force
behavior of workers at diﬀerent ages to infer the role played by SS. Hurd
(1990) and Ruhm (1995) emphasize the spike in the age pattern of retire-
ment at age sixty-two; as Hurd states, “there are no other institutional or
economic reasons for the peak” (597). Using quarterly data, Blau (1994)
ﬁnds that almost one-quarter of the men in the labor force at their sixty-
ﬁfth birthday retire in the next three months; this hazard rate is over 2.5
times as large as the rate in surrounding quarters. Lumsdaine and Wise
(1994) examine this excess retirement at sixty-ﬁve and conclude that it can-
not be explained by the change in the actuarial adjustment at this age, by
the incentives in private pension plans, or by the availability of retirement
health insurance through Medicare. However, SS may still play an impor-
tant role by setting up the focal point of a normal retirement age.
The main body of the retirement incentives literature attempts to specif-
ically model the role that potential SS beneﬁts play in determining retire-
ment. The earliest work in this area considered reduced-form models of the
retirement decision as a function of SS wealth (SSW) and pension levels.
Much of this literature is reviewed in Mitchell and Fields (1982); more re-
cent cites include Diamond and Hausman (1984) and Blau (1994). While
these articles diﬀer in the estimation strategies, with the more recent work
using richer models, such as nonlinear 2SLS or hazard modeling, their re-
sults generally suggest that SS’s role is signiﬁcant but small relative to the
time trends in retirement behavior.
A key limitation of these studies is that they consider SS eﬀects at a point
in time, but not any impacts on the retirement decision arising from the
time pattern of SSW accruals. This was remedied in three diﬀerent ways by
subsequent literatures. The ﬁrst was to use structural models of retirement
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Burtless (1986), Burtless and Moﬃtt (1984), Gustman and Steinmeier
(1985, 1986), and Rust and Phelan (1997). The second was to estimate re-
duced-form models, but incorporate the accrual of SSW with a year of ad-
ditional work; for example, see Fields and Mitchell (1984), Hausman and
Wise (1985), and Sueyoshi (1989). Both of these types of studies continued
to ﬁnd an important, but modest, role for SS, and some indicated a larger
role for private pensions. The ﬁnal type of literature is the option value
work of Stock and Wise noted previously.7
A ﬁnal article that deserves particular mention is that of Krueger and
Pischke (1992). They note that the key regressor in many of these articles,
SS beneﬁts, is a nonlinear function of past earnings and that retirement
propensities are clearly correlated with past earnings. They solve this prob-
lem by using a unique natural experiment provided by the end of double-
indexing for the “notch generation” that retired in the late 1970s and early
1980s. For this cohort, SS beneﬁts were greatly reduced relative to what
they would have expected, yet the dramatic fall in labor force participation
continued unabated in this era. This raises important questions about the
identiﬁcation of the cross-sectional literature. However, Krueger and Pis-
chke still ﬁnd signiﬁcant and sizeable impacts of SS accruals on retirement,
which highlights the value of the dynamic approach and suggest that the
additional nonlinearities that govern the evolution of SSW (as opposed to
its level) may be a fruitful source of identiﬁcation for retirement models.
Each of these dynamic literatures has important limitations. The ﬁrst
suﬀers from the perhaps untenable assumptions that are required to iden-
tify these very complicated structural models.8The second suﬀers from the
limited way in which dynamic retirement incentives are speciﬁed. Some
of these problems are remedied by the option value literature, but this lit-
erature has not separated the impact of SS incentives, as distinct from pen-
sion incentives, on retirement.9 If all dollars of retirement wealth are not
weighed equally by potential retirees, either because individuals under-
stand their ﬁrm’s pension incentives better than SS incentives or because
the real annuity provided by SS is valued diﬀerently than the nominal an-
nuity provided by most deﬁned-beneﬁt pensions, then it is important to
separately estimate SS and private pension impacts.10
In addition, all of these studies suﬀer from important data deﬁciencies,
as they use data from the 1970s (when the structure of the SS system was
fairly diﬀerent), data from only a handful of ﬁrms, or data without com-
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7. See also Samwick (1998), who uses the option value model in a reduced-form context.
8. For a criticism of this type in the context of this type of estimation of general labor supply
responses, see MaCurdy (1981).
9. Stock and Wise did not attempt this decomposition, and Samwick’s (1998) attempt to do
so with a reduced-form version of the option value model was unsuccessful, perhaps due to
the measurement error in SS incentives arising from a lack of earnings-history data.
10. The latter is suggested by Diamond and Hausman (1984), who ﬁnd much smaller eﬀects
of pensions on retirement than those of SS.plete information on SS incentives. Finally, all of the literature suﬀer from
a lack of careful attention to the sources of identiﬁcation of the retirement
incentive eﬀects that they estimate. As highlighted by Krueger and Pischke
(1992), SS beneﬁts are a nonlinear function of earnings, making it diﬃcult
to disentangle their impact from the separate impact of earnings on the
work decision. This problem is not necessarily surmounted and is poten-
tially compounded, by the option value literature, as this measure is largely
determined by wage diﬀerences across individuals and only secondarily in-
ﬂuenced by the structure of retirement incentives. In principle, this prob-
lem can be surmounted by structural estimation of the option value model,
which will identify the diﬀerence in the impacts of wages and retirement in-
come on retirement decisions through the value of leisure parameter. But,
in practice, this is only true if the particular utility structure is correct; for
example, if the additional leisure of utility enters the model only as a mul-
tiplier on postretirement income and not in some other way.
To address these concerns, Coile and Gruber (2000, 2001) introduce a
new measure, peak value, which incorporates the insights of the option
value measure but focuses solely on variation in SS incentives. This is com-
parable to the accrual, but looks forward more than just one year: It cal-
culates the diﬀerence between SSW at its maximum expected value and
SSW at today’s value in order to measure the incentive to continued work.
The peak value appropriately considers the trade-oﬀ between retiring to-
day and working to a period with much higher SSW, thereby capturing the
option value of continued work even before SS entitlement ages are
reached. Since wage is not included speciﬁcally into the peak value calcu-
lation, there is much more variation from the structure of the SS entitle-
ment.11 In the empirical analysis below, both peak value and option value
are used in a reduced-form context.
12.3 Data and Empirical Strategy
12.3.1 Data
Our data for this analysis comes from the HRS.12The HRS is a survey of
12,652 individuals aged ﬁfty-one to sixty-one in 1992 with reinterviews
every two years; the ﬁrst four waves of the survey (1992, 1994, 1996, and
1998) are used in this analysis.13 Spouses of respondents are also inter-
viewed, so the total age range covered by the survey is much wider.
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11. In our sample, an earnings quartic and age dummies explain only 33 percent of the vari-
ation in peak value versus 74 percent of the variation in option value.
12. The HRS is conducted by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan in
Ann Arbor, Michigan. The data is available at http://www.umich.edu/~hrswww/. Most of the
data is publicly available, although the SS and ﬁrm-level private-pension data is restricted to
approved users.
13. The 1998 wave 4 data are preliminary.A key feature of the HRS is that it includes SS earnings histories back to
1951 for most respondents. This provides two advantages for our empiri-
cal work. First, it allows us to appropriately calculate beneﬁt entitlements,
which depend on the entire history of earnings.14 Second, it allows us to
construct a large sample of person-year15 observations by using the earn-
ings histories to compute SS retirement incentives and labor force partici-
pation at each age. We use all person-year observations age ﬁfty-ﬁve to
sixty-nine for our analysis, subject to the exclusions detailed below.
Our sample is selected conditional on working, so that we examine the
incentives for retirement conditional on being in the labor force. Work is
deﬁned in one of two ways. For those person-years before 1992, when we
are using earnings histories, we deﬁne work as positive earnings in two con-
secutive years; if earnings are positive this year, but zero the next (and if the
year of zero earnings occurs at or after age ﬁfty-ﬁve), we consider the per-
son to have retired this year.16 For person-years from 1992 onwards, when
we have the actual survey responses, we cannot use this earnings-based
deﬁnition since we only have earnings at two year intervals. For this era, we
use information on self-reported retirement status and dates of retirement
to construct retirement measures.17 We only consider individuals before
their ﬁrst retirement; if a person who is categorized as retired reenters the
labor force, the later observations are not used.
Our sample selection criteria are as follows for men. There are 5,886 men
who appear in waves 1, 2, or 3 of the HRS.18We ﬁrst exclude 1,533 men who
are missing SS earnings history data. These data, fortunately, appear to be
missing essentially randomly, as noted by Haider and Solon (1999). We
then exclude 99 observations where the respondent or spouse was born
prior to 1922, as these individuals are subject to diﬀerent SS beneﬁt rules.
We also exclude 240 observations where the wife is missing SS earnings
history data (necessary due to the family structure of beneﬁts) and 67 ob-
servations with an ambiguous work history.19 Next, we exclude 730 men
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14. Only earnings since 1950 are required to compute SS beneﬁts for our sample’s age
range; the beneﬁt rules specify that a shorter averaging period is used for persons born prior
to 1929.
15. “Person-years” means that an observation represents a given person in a given year, so
that there are multiple observations for each person.
16. One potential problem with using earnings histories to deﬁne retirement is that an in-
dividual may move from the private sector to the state and local government sector, in which
case they would be classiﬁed as retired when, in fact, they are still working. We ﬁnd that
results are similar when individuals who list their industry as public administration are
dropped.
17. If an individual simultaneously reports their labor supply status as working and retired,
we treat them as working.
18. Observations that enter the sample at wave 4 will not be used in the analysis, as multiple
observations on the same person are required to establish work and retirement status.
19. Observations with missing spouse data are those for which we know that the spouse
worked at least half as many years as their partner, but for which we don’t have their SS earn-
ings records. Observations with an ambiguous work history are those who have zero coveredwho retired prior to age ﬁfty-ﬁve. The remaining 3,217 men are converted
into 18,733 person-year observations by creating one observation for each
year from 1980 through 1997 in which the individual is between the ages of
ﬁfty-ﬁve and sixty-nine and working at the beginning of the year. Finally,
we exclude 988 person-year observations that represent labor force reentry
after a previous retirement. The ﬁnal sample size is 17,745 male observa-
tions. A similar process generates a sample size of 11,419 female observa-
tions.
The means of our key variables are shown in table 12.2 for men and
women, respectively. In any given year, a similar percentage of the male
and female sample retire, 5.7 percent for men and 5.6 percent for women.
The average age of our sample is 58.5 for men and 58 for women. Some 91
percent of our male sample is married, and the typical man is 4.3 years
older than his wife, while only 64 percent of our female sample is married,
and the typical woman is 1.3 years younger than her husband.20 Roughly
80 percent of both samples are white. Among the male sample, 24 percent
are high school dropouts, 36 percent have only a high school degree, 14
percent have some college, and 25 percent are college graduates; for women,
the ﬁgures are 19 percent, 42 percent, 17 percent, and 22 percent, respec-
tively. The average projected earnings for the next year of work are $36,152
for men and $20,984 for women (in 1998 dollars), and the average monthly
earnings over the working life are $2,470 for men and $1,102 for women.
The typical spouse’s earnings (averaging over single people, people with
nonworking spouses, and people with working spouses) are $10,813 for an
additional year of work and $612 per month on average over the spouse’s
lifetime for the male sample, and $16,489 and $1,475 for the female sample.
The typical man in our sample has forty years of labor market experience
and seventeen years of tenure on their current job, and 5.4 percent of our
sample is missing tenure information (indicating a short-term job); equiv-
alent ﬁgures for women are thirty-nine and thirteen years and 6.6 percent.
12.3.2 Incentive Variable Calculation—Accrual
Our goal is to measure the retirement incentives inherent in the SS sys-
tem. The ﬁrst step in this calculation uses a simulation model we have de-
veloped to compute the PIA for any individual at all possible future retire-
ment dates. This process is based on a careful modeling of SS beneﬁts rules
and has been cross-checked against the SS Administration’s ANYPIA
The Eﬀect of Social Security on Retirement in the United States 701
earnings in the administrative data from age ﬁfty-four through 1991, have positive self-
reported earnings in 1991, and report that they have changed jobs between age ﬁfty-four and
1991; they are excluded because it is impossible to know whether they have retired prior to
1991 and reentered the labor force.
20. The fact that a lower fraction of the female sample is married is a result of the fact that
when the sample selection criteria is applied, women who are still working at age ﬁfty-ﬁve are
less likely to be married than men who are still working at age ﬁfty-ﬁve.702 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber





Education; less than high school 0.241 0.428
Education; high school 0.363 0.481
Education; some college 0.136 0.343
Married 0.914 0.281
Age diﬀerent with spouse 4.3 4.9
Race; black 0.101 0.301
Race; other nonwhite 0.081 0.273
Earnings 36,152 18,926
AIME 2,470 945
Spouse’s earnings 10,813 14,117
Spouse’s AIME 612 654
Experience 40 4
Job tenure 17 12
Job tenure missing 0.054 0.227
Have pension 0.348 0.476
No. of observations 17,745




Education; less than high school 0.193 0.395
Education; high school 0.424 0.494
Education; some college 0.168 0.374
Married 0.640 0.480
Age diﬀerent with spouse –1.3 3.6
Race; black 0.163 0.369
Race; other nonwhite 0.071 0.257
Earnings 20,984 14,887
AIME 1,102 735
Spouse’s earnings 16,489 21,168
Spouse’s AIME 1,475 1,413
Experience 39 4
Job tenure 13 10
Job tenure missing 0.066 0.248
Have pension 0.325 0.468
No. of observations 11,419
No. of individuals 2,526
Note: SD = standard deviation.
model for accuracy. The appropriate actuarial adjustment is applied to the
PIA to obtain the monthly beneﬁt entitlement.
The next step is to compute the expected net present discounted value of
SSW associated with each retirement date. Our methodology for doing so
is described in Coile and Gruber (2000, 2001). For single workers, this issimply a sum of future beneﬁts discounted by time preference rates and
survival probabilities. For married workers, it is more complicated since we
must include dependent spouse and survivor beneﬁts and account for the
joint likelihood of survival of the worker and dependent. We use a real dis-
count rate of 3 percent and survival probabilities from the age- and sex-
speciﬁc U.S. life tables from the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (National Center for Health Statistics 1990, sec. 6).
We next compute the other SS incentive variables. We ﬁrst calculate the
accrual, the change in SSW resulting from an additional year of work.
There are two routes through which an additional year of work aﬀects
SSW. First, the additional year of earnings will be used in the recomputa-
tion of SS beneﬁts. For workers who have not yet worked thirty-ﬁve years,
this replaces a zero in the beneﬁts computation; for workers who have
worked thirty-ﬁve years, it may replace a previous low-earnings year. So
the recomputation raises SSW (or leaves it unchanged). Second, at ages
sixty-two and beyond, the additional year of work implies a delay in claim-
ing; this raises future beneﬁts through the actuarial adjustment, but re-
duces the number of years of beneﬁt receipt, so the net eﬀect is uncertain.
Both of these factors will aﬀect workers diﬀerently, depending on their po-
tential earnings next year, earnings history, mortality prospects (which will
vary over time and cohort in our data), family structure, and spouse’s earn-
ings. Thus, the net eﬀect of an additional year of work on SSW is theoreti-
cally ambiguous and will vary signiﬁcantly across people.
Computing the accrual and other incentive variables requires projecting
the worker’s potential earnings next year (or in all future years). We con-
sidered a number of diﬀerent projection methodologies and found that the
best predictive performance was from a model which simply grew real
earnings from the last observation by 1 percent per year, so we use this as-
sumption in our simulations.21
Our SS incentive variables incorporate dependent spouse and survivor
beneﬁts, since these are important components of SSW. For a worker with
a nonworking spouse, these beneﬁts are based solely on the worker’s earn-
ings record. For a worker whose spouse is entitled to beneﬁts on their own,
the spouse’s beneﬁts are based (partially or fully) on the spouse’s record,
but are also included in SSW. Since a full modeling of the joint retirement
decision is beyond the scope of this paper, we simply assume that spouses
who are working will retire at age sixty-two; this seems reasonable, given
that the median retirement age is sixty-two for women in the sample and
sixty-three for men. For more evidence on joint retirement decisions, see
Coile (1999).
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21. Projected earnings always represent potential earnings for one full year. For example,
in the case where an individual earns $2X in year t and $X in year t   1 because they retire
halfway through the year, the year t   1 observation has projected real earnings of $2X  
(1.01) and there is no t   2 observation (since the individual retires in year t   1).For the simulations below, we assume that workers claim SS beneﬁts at
retirement or when they become eligible (age sixty-two), if they have retired
before then. In fact, this is not necessarily true; retirement and claiming are
two distinct events, and for certain values of mortality prospects and dis-
count rates, it is optimal to delay claiming until some time after retirement,
due to the actuarial adjustment of beneﬁts. Coile et al. (2002) investigate
this issue in some detail, and they ﬁnd that a relatively small share of those
retiring before age sixty-two delay claiming until age sixty-three (about 10
percent) and that virtually none of those retiring at age sixty-two or later
delay claiming. Given these ﬁndings, we choose not to jointly model de-
layed claiming here. Our incentive measures will therefore slightly over-
state any subsidies to continued work, since part of this subsidy will come
from delayed claiming that could be obtained without delaying retirement.
We  do not incorporate private pension incentives into our analysis.
Coile and Gruber (2000) estimate retirement models that include both SS
and pension incentives, and they ﬁnd that the results diﬀer signiﬁcantly
from those for SS alone. This suggests that changes in private pension pro-
visions may have diﬀerent impacts on retirement than changes in public
pensions, so that one should not extrapolate the eﬀect of public pension
reform from private pension responses. Thus, since our primary goal is to
discuss the impacts of public pensions on retirement, we exclude private
pensions here.
Table 12.3 shows the medians of the retirement incentive variables for
our male sample by age. The median present discounted value (PDV) rises
from $179,316 at age ﬁfty-ﬁve to a peak of $205,584 at age sixty-ﬁve, then
falls to $194,555 at age sixty-nine.22 The age pattern of accruals demon-
strates how the various eﬀects of working an additional year enter in at
diﬀerent ages. From ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one, accruals are positive, but
small, reﬂecting the value of the dropout year provision. From ages sixty-
two to sixty-four, accruals are two to three times larger; this is the delayed-
claiming eﬀect, whereby an additional year of work increases the actuarial
adjustment and raises future beneﬁts.23 After age sixty-ﬁve, accruals be-
come negative and rise rapidly, as the delayed retirement credit is insuﬃ-
cient to compensate for the value of lost beneﬁts.
Most importantly for our analysis, there is enormous heterogeneity in
accruals, as is also shown in table 12.3. The standard deviation in accru-
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22. The SSW median displayed in table 12.2 is the median SSW at age ﬁfty-ﬁve increased or
decreased each year by the median accrual. The median SSW at each age in the sample rises
much more rapidly with age due to a sample selection eﬀect (those working at later ages have
higher SSW).
23. This large subsidy to work at age sixty-two is at odds with the common wisdom that the
actuarial reduction at age sixty-two is approximately fair. This point is developed much fur-
ther in Coile and Gruber (2000).als is substantial, averaging roughly $3,000 per year. At sixty-two, for ex-
ample, while there is a sizeable positive median accrual, the tenth percen-
tile person has an accrual of only $978 and the ninetieth percentile person
has an accrual of $7,032; the standard deviation at that age is $2,691. It is
this sizeable variation that identiﬁes our models.
Table 12.4 shows the median retirement incentives for women by age.
For women, median accruals are much smaller at all ages than they are for
men, and there are no large accruals at ages sixty-two to sixty-four. In large
part, this is because women have typically been less attached to the labor
force over their working lives and are often dually entitled to beneﬁts as
both retired workers and as a dependent (or divorced) spouses or widows.
If a woman’s retired-worker beneﬁts are less than what she is entitled to as
a dependent spouse, then additional work will typically not result in a
higher beneﬁt. It is also worth noting that in the HRS, earnings histories
are not available for divorced or deceased spouses; since more women than
men are likely to be receiving beneﬁts based on the record of a divorced or
deceased spouse, estimates of women’s incentives are likely to be subject to
greater measurement error. Table 12.4 also shows that there is signiﬁcant
heterogeneity in women’s accruals.
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Table 12.3 The Distribution of the One-Year Accrual, Male Sample
Accrual
Number Median 10th 90th Median Median Tax
Age of Obs. SSW Median Percentile Percentile SD Tax Rate Rate 2
55 2,809 179,316 2,554 322 5,492 2,334 –0.072 –0.022
56 2,747 181,870 2,369 243 5,032 3,859 –0.066 0.046
57 2,444 184,239 2,128 167 4,555 3,382 –0.061 0.060
58 2,143 186,367 1,948 66 4,233 2,497 –0.054 0.069
59 1,823 188,315 1,793 12 4,136 3,191 –0.048 0.072
60 1,546 190,108 1,662 0 4,190 2,007 –0.042 0.071
61 1,255 191,770 1,670 0 4,170 5,113 –0.043 0.064
62 1,021 193,440 4,349 978 7,032 2,691 –0.118 –0.028
63 716 197,789 4,511 430 7,394 3,532 –0.122 –0.005
64 483 202,300 3,284 0 6,152 2,631 –0.093 0.031
65 344 205,584 (1,123) (4,741) 1,785 4,470 0.027 0.118
66 191 204,461 (2,301) (5,591) 600 2,996 0.059 0.225
67 110 202,160 (3,302) (6,773) 0 8,027 0.114 0.269
68 71 198,858 (4,303) (7,530) 0 2,693 0.134 0.439
69 42 194,555 (4,758) (7,825) 0 2,735 0.119 0.455
Notes:Tax rate 2 is from Diamond and Gruber (1999). Deﬁnitions of other variables are provided in the
text. Median SSW is the age-55 median SSW incremented by the median accrual. All ﬁgures are 1998
dollars. One source of diﬀerence between the median tax rate and tax rate 2 is that tax rate 2 includes SS
contributions. Adding the 12.4% payroll tax to the median tax rate results in ﬁgures very similar to tax
rate 2. SD = standard deviation. Numbers in parentheses are negative.12.3.3 Incentive Variable Calculation—Forward-Looking Measures
The recent work on retirement has highlighted an important weakness
of the accrual measure. For any given year from age ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one,
as we show in table 12.3, a typical worker sees a small positive accrual from
additional work through the recomputation of the AIME. But, by work-
ing, that worker is also buying an option on the more-than-fair actuarial
adjustment that exists from age sixty-two to sixty-four. Incorporating this
option dramatically changes the nature of SS incentives, particularly at
ages before age sixty-two, as documented in Coile and Gruber (2001). For
a sizeable minority of workers, accrual patterns are nonmonotonic, so that
forward-looking measures can deliver very diﬀerent incentives than one-
year accruals.
As noted above, Stock and Wise (1990a) propose to account for these
option values by contrasting the utility of retiring today versus at the opti-
mal point in the future. Their option value model is based on the individ-
ual’s indirect utility function over work and leisure
(1) V t(R)   ∑
R 1
s t
pstds t(ys)g   ∑
T
s R
pstds t[k   Bs(R)]g,
where R is the retirement date, d is the discount rate, p is the probability of
being alive at some future date conditional on being alive today, yis income
while working, B is retirement beneﬁts, g is a parameter of risk aversion, 
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Table 12.4 The Distribution of the One-Year Accrual, Female Sample
Accrual
Number Median 10th 90th Median Tax
Age of Obs. SSW Median Percentile Percentile SD Rate
55 2,124 163,139 1,100 0 3,200 2,506 –0.055
56 1,954 164,239 1,176 0 3,185 2,503 –0.057
57 1,711 165,415 1,186 0 3,168 2,319 –0.059
58 1,455 166,601 1,200 0 3,138 2,975 –0.061
59 1,201 167,801 1,203 0 3,122 2,576 –0.064
60 944 169,004 1,282 0 3,119 2,355 –0.065
61 726 170,286 1,317 0 3,365 4,334 –0.069
62 547 171,603 1,360 (586) 5,126 3,732 –0.639
63 352 172,963 919 (1,264) 4,647 3,094 –0.045
64 217 173,882 104 (1,927) 4,126 2,597 –0.012
65 119 173,986 (1,534) (4,711) 1,319 7,173 0.052
66 48 172,452 (1,649) (5,031) 1,251 5,572 0.062
67 12 170,803 (2,692) (6,940) 332 5,831 0.087
68 5 168,111 (4,066) (7,998) (443) 2,780 0.186
69 4 164,045 (4,178) (5,280) (745) 2,081 0.151
Note: See table 12.3.k is a parameter to account for disutility of labor (k   1), and T is maxi-
mum life length.
In this model, additional work has three eﬀects. First, it raises total wage
earnings, increasing utility. Second, it reduces the number of years over
which beneﬁts are received, lowering utility. Third, it may raise or lower the
beneﬁt amount, depending on the shape of the beneﬁt function, B(R). The
latter two eﬀects are weighted more heavily because of the disutility of la-
bor, which acts as a devaluation of wage income relative to retirement in-
come. The optimal date of retirement is the date at which the utility gained
from the increase in earnings resulting from additional work is outweighed
by the utility lost from the decrease in retirement income. The option value
is the diﬀerence between the indirect utility from retirement at the optimal
date, R∗, and the indirect utility from retirement today. As a structural es-
timation of the option value model is beyond the scope of this paper, we in-
stead calculate the option value using reasonable utility parameters and
include it as a regressor in a retirement model.24
As mentioned above, one possible weakness of the option value model is
that much of the variation in this measure arises from diﬀerences in wages,
which may not be a legitimate source of identiﬁcation of retirement eﬀects.
We take two approaches to addressing this potential shortcoming. First,
we include rich controls for earnings in the retirement model to capture the
heterogeneity that may bias these estimates. However, since wages enter
highly nonlinearly in the option value and the form of heterogeneity is un-
known, even rich wage controls may not fully capture the underlying cor-
respondence between option value and tastes for work.
Therefore, we also estimate retirement models utilizing the peak value
measure. As described above, peak value is the diﬀerence between SSW at
its maximum expected value and SSW at today’s value.25 In this way, the
peak value incorporates the insights of the option value measure and ap-
propriately considers the trade-oﬀ between retiring today and working to
a period with much higher SSW, but focuses solely on variation in SS in-
centives.
Table 12.5 shows the age pattern and heterogeneity for peak and option
value for the male sample. The important diﬀerences between peak value
and accrual, particularly at younger ages, are immediately apparent; peak
values are quite large, at ages ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-one, a range where accruals
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24. We follow Stock and Wise in assuming values of 1.5 and 0.75 for k and g, respectively,
but we found that the ﬁt of our model was much better with a more reasonable assumption
for dof 0.97, relative to the very high discount rate of 0.75 obtained from their model. We also
tested the robustness of our model to the choice of k and g and the results are not sensitive to
this choice.
25. If the individual is at an age that is beyond the SSW optimum, then the peak value is the
diﬀerence between retirement this year and next year, which is exactly the accrual rate.708 Courtney Coile and Jonathan Gruber
Table 12.5 The Distribution of the Peak Value and Option Value, Male Sample
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Age Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
55 23,579 4,785 42,312 16,253 23,755 4,956 37,331 11,461
56 21,266 4,276 39,893 15,790 22,030 4,728 35,302 10,780
57 18,548 3,929 37,021 14,386 20,207 4,134 32,641 10,119
58 16,804 3,630 34,450 13,865 18,390 3,258 30,507 9,512
59 15,456 3,105 31,339 13,398 16,894 2,879 28,240 8,861
60 14,083 2,479 28,931 12,559 15,225 2,041 25,728 8,217
61 12,925 2,059 24,597 12,320 13,623 1,775 23,146 7,477
62 11,886 1,769 21,665 10,363 11,877 1,442 20,767 6,649
63 8,102 762 15,267 9,707 10,143 1,257 18,164 5,913
64 3,508 0 8,805 7,954 8,057 452 15,343 5,113
65 (1,042) (4,692) 4,908 9,099 6,187 0 12,606 4,396
66 (2,250) (5,591) 1,520 7,556 4,342 0 9,850 3,612
67 (3,302) (6,773) 0 9,033 2,690 0 7,662 3,048
68 (4,303) (7,530) 0 2,871 1,962 0 5,151 1,937
69 (4,758) (7,825) 0 2,735 893 0 2,616 963
Notes: Peak value is in 1998 dollars; option value is in utility units. SD = standard deviations. Numbers
in parentheses are negative.
are small.26The peak value declines sharply with age, as people move closer
to or reach their optimal retirement date; the declines occur at a fairly con-
stant rate up until about age sixty-two, then become very large. The peak
value is positive for the median person until they reach age sixty-ﬁve, and
then it becomes negative. As with the accrual, there is an enormous
amount of heterogeneity in all of these measures that can be used to iden-
tify our models. Part of this variance arises from heterogeneity in the peak
year. For 38 percent of our sample, age sixty-ﬁve is the peak; for 11 percent,
it is age seventy, and there are substantial masses at ages sixty-six, sixty-
seven, sixty-eight, and sixty-nine. Partly, this reﬂects the evolving generos-
ity of the DRC over time; the peak occurs after age sixty-ﬁve for 28 percent
of the workers in the oldest cohorts in our sample versus 73 percent of the
workers in the youngest cohorts.
Although option value is measured in utility units and cannot be directly
compared to peak value, option value follows the same declining pattern
26. Note that we take the median of each variable, so that all the numbers in any given row
do not necessarily represent the incentives facing a single person. This explains a seeming in-
consistency between tables 12.3 and 12.5, which is that the accruals from age ﬁfty-ﬁve through
age sixty-four add up to more than the peak value at age ﬁfty-ﬁve, despite the fact that age
sixty-ﬁve is often the peak for SSW. As we show in Coile and Gruber (2001), this is a fallacy
of composition, and for any given individual the peak value is just the sum of accruals to the
peak SSW age.as peak value. The median option value falls monotonically with age, but
remains positive even beyond age sixty-ﬁve, as additional earnings oﬀset
losses in SSW. There is also substantial heterogeneity in the option value
measure.
Table 12.6 shows the distribution of the peak value and option value
measures by age for the female sample. The age trends are largely similar
to those for men, although the dollar amounts are smaller since women
typically beneﬁt less from additional work for reasons described previously
and also have lower earnings, which lowers the option value.
12.4 Empirical Framework and Results
12.4.1 Regression Framework
In a standard retirement model, SS will play two roles in the decision re-
garding whether to retire this year or to continue working. The ﬁrst is
through wealth eﬀects: higher SSW will induce individuals to consume
more of all goods, including leisure, and to retire earlier. The second is
through accrual eﬀects: the individual’s decision to continue to work is a
function of the increase in retirement consumption resulting from addi-
tional work.
Following this discussion, we use the incentive variables described above
to run regressions of the form
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Table 12.6 The Distribution of the Peak Value and Option Value, Female Sample
Peak Value Option Value
10th 90th 10th 90th
Age Median Percentile Percentile SD Median Percentile Percentile SD
55 9,359 166 33,369 14,639 12,506 1,174 27,876 10,113
56 8,981 134 32,237 14,144 12,195 953 26,443 9,599
57 8,097 120 30,074 13,791 11,309 794 24,471 8,952
58 6,799 90 28,006 13,325 10,235 574 22,223 8,311
59 5,724 78 24,602 12,323 9,334 369 20,350 7,649
60 4,889 70 21,578 11,991 8,705 338 18,780 7,046
61 3,685 39 19,680 12,077 7,584 131 16,594 6,352
62 2,121 (553) 17,115 9,432 6,447 130 14,218 5,460
63 1,424 (1,264) 12,171 8,539 5,514 88 12,292 4,778
64 280 (1,927) 7,806 7,574 4,382 0 10,169 4,040
65 (1,534) (4,711) 3,880 9,901 3,496 0 8,995 3,535
66 (1,601) (5,031) 3,651 7,387 2,504 0 7,761 2,761
67 (2,692) (6,940) 332 6,362 2,281 0 5,800 2,194
68 (4,066) (7,998) (443) 2,780 1,417 130 4,796 1,804
69 (4,178) (5,280) (745) 2,081 274 0 706 340
Note: See table 12.5.(2) Rit   b0   b1SSW it   b2INCENTit   b3Xit   b4AGEit   b5EARNit
  b6AIMEit   b7MARit   b8AGEDIFF i   b9SPEARNit
  b10SPAIMEit   b11Yt   e,
where SSW is the expected PDV of SS beneﬁts that is available to the per-
son if he retires that year (t); INCENT is one of the incentive measures
noted above (accrual, option value, and peak value); X is a vector of con-
trol variables that may importantly inﬂuence the retirement decision, but
do not enter directly into the calculation of SSW (education, race, veteran
status, born in the United States, region of residence, experience in the la-
bor market and its square,27 tenure at the ﬁrm and its square, thirteen ma-
jor industry dummies, and seventeen major occupation dummies); AGE is
either entered linearly or as a set of dummies for each age ﬁfty-ﬁve to sixty-
nine; EARN is a control for potential earnings in the next year; AIME is a
control for average monthly lifetime earnings as of period t;28 MAR is a
dummy for marital status; AGEDIFF controls for the age diﬀerence with
the spouse; SPEARN and SPAIME are the spouse’s next year and average
lifetime earnings; and Y is a series of year dummies. Since our dependent
variable is dichotomous, we estimate the model as a probit. We have also
estimated these models as Cox proportional hazard models and the results
were very similar; this is not surprising, given that the models all include a
full set of age dummies that pick up the same factors captured by the base-
line in the hazard model.
This model parallels the types of models used in the ﬁrst round of re-
search on SS and retirement, with one important exception: the earnings
controls. Most articles in this literature did not control for earnings, and no
articles controlled for both earnings around time of retirement and average
lifetime earnings. Yet both of these variables are clearly important deter-
minants of both SS incentives and retirement decisions, so excluding them
from the model imparts a potential omitted variables bias. Moreover, there
is no reason to suspect that heterogeneity is a purely linear function of
earnings. Thus, for each of the earnings controls previously listed, we in-
clude squared, cubed, and quartic terms as well. Moreover, it is possible
that heterogeneity in retirement is also related to the relationship between
current and average lifetime earnings; we therefore also include a full set of
interactions between the EARN and AIME quartics in order to reﬂect this.
Finally, it is important to highlight that our work is focused on the im-
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27. Experience is deﬁned as age minus years of education minus six, since the HRS self-
reported earnings histories may have gaps and administrative data do not include employ-
ment in noncovered sectors.
28. Note that AIME is time varying because additional years of work change average life-
time earnings through the dropout-year provision.pact of SS on the labor force participation decision. A separate and inter-
esting issue is the impact of SS on the marginal labor supply decision
among those participating in the labor force. This is more complicated for
those around retirement age, since it involves incorporating the role of the
earnings test, which we avoid with our analysis of participation. This, in
turn, would involve modeling expectations about the earnings test, since
individuals appear not to understand that this is just a beneﬁts delay in-
stead of a beneﬁts cut. This is clearly a fruitful avenue for further research.
12.4.2 Social Security Incentives and Retirement
Table 12.7 shows the results of estimating equation (2) for men for the
three incentive measures and the two possible sets of age controls. Peak
value, accrual, and SSW are expressed in $100,000; option value is ex-
pressed in units of 10,000. The magnitude of the coeﬃcients is illustrated
by the term in square brackets, which gives the implied percentage-point
impact of a $1,000 increase in the accrual/peak value and a $10,000 in-
crease in SSW.
In all the models, we estimate a positive impact of SSW levels, as ex-
pected; however, the coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level in only
two of the six models. The coeﬃcient implies that each $10,000 increase in
SSW increases the probability of retirement by about 0.2 percent, or about
3.5 percent of the sample average retirement rate; evaluated at the mean,
this corresponds to an elasticity of nonparticipation with respect to bene-
ﬁts of 0.60. The coeﬃcients are about 50 percent greater in the models with
linear age than in those with age dummies.
The coeﬃcient on the accrual is the wrong sign (positive) and is highly
insigniﬁcant once age dummies are included in the model. This suggests
that there is little impact of one-year-forward incentives on retirement de-
cisions. This could reﬂect the fact that individuals are not at all forward-
looking in their decisions. Alternatively, given nonlinearities in future ac-
cruals, it could represent the fact that individuals are not considering solely
the accrual to the next year but the entire future path of incentives.
This possibility is addressed in the next two sets of columns, which show
the estimates from the peak value and option value models. In both cases,
we now estimate signiﬁcant negative impacts of the forward-looking in-
centive measures for retirement decisions. We ﬁnd that each $1,000 in peak
value lowers the odds of retirement by 0.05 percent, or about 1 percent of
the sample average retirement rate; this corresponds to an elasticity of non-
participation with respect to beneﬁts of 0.15. For option value, it is not
possible to calculate the impact of a simple $1,000 increment since this is a
utility-based metric; we will return to comparisons of these two models in
the simulation section below.
The coeﬃcients on peak value and option value are similar whether age
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Speciﬁcation
Accrual Peak Value Option Value
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SSW 0.3581 0.2190 0.2519 0.1718 0.1730 0.1075
(0.1163) (0.1162) (0.1157) (0.1170) (0.1146) (0.1173)
$10,000 changea [0.0030] [0.0018] [0.0021] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0009]
Incentive measure 1.8360 0.4560 –0.4289 –0.5697 –0.2368 –0.2106
(0.3648) (0.4137) (0.2238) (0.2367) (0.0539) (0.0522)
$1,000 changeb [0.0015] [0.0004] [–0.0004] [–0.0005]
Age 0.0922 0.0877 0.0691
(0.0154) (0.0155) (0.0162)
Age56 –0.0311 –0.0332 –0.0470
(0.0706) (0.0707) (0.0711)
Age57 –0.0693 –0.0759 –0.1075
(0.0808) (0.0810) (0.0816)
Age58 0.0587 0.0479 0.0009
(0.0877) (0.0878) (0.0890)
Age59 0.0696 0.0579 –0.0065
(0.0986) (0.0989) (0.1006)
Age60 0.2079 0.1932 0.1082
(0.1088) (0.1092) (0.1117)
Age61 0.3032 0.2847 0.1794
(0.1178) (0.1179) (0.1215)
Age62 0.8999 0.8897 0.7650
(0.1279) (0.1268) (0.1321)
Age63 0.8122 0.7852 0.6512
(0.1446) (0.1439) (0.1495)
Age64 0.6908 0.6424 0.5050
(0.1622) (0.1628) (0.1682)
Age65 1.0796 0.9881 0.8534
(0.1779) (0.1819) (0.1870)
Age66 0.5924 0.4928 0.3540
(0.2062) (0.2097) (0.2146)
Age67 0.4542 0.3467 0.1953
(0.2539) (0.2578) (0.2615)
Age68 0.7229 0.5974 0.4231
(0.2387) (0.2429) (0.2483)
Pseudo R2 0.1215 0.1379 0.1198 0.1386 0.1223 0.1402
Notes: All regressions include controls for education, race, experience, marital status, indus-
try, occupation, region, year, as well as a quartic in earnings, a quartic in lifetime earnings, and
the interactions of these quartics (plus same earnings variables for the spouse). Standard de-
viations in parentheses. Magnitude of coeﬃcients is in square brackets.
aImplied percentage-point impact of a $10,000 increase in SSW.
bImplied percentage-point impact of a $1,000 increase in SSW.is controlled for using a linear variable or age dummies. The goodness of ﬁt
of all six models is similar, with a pseudo R2 of about 12 percent in models
without age dummies and 14 percent in models with age dummies. These
ﬁndings suggest that the forward-looking models of the type advocated by
Stock and Wise are very important for explaining retirement behavior. In-
dividuals do appear to recognize the future path of SSW accumulation,
and they take this into account in making their retirement decisions.
The other variables in the regression have their expected impacts.29
There is a rising pattern of retirement propensities with age, with particu-
larly large eﬀects at ages sixty-two, sixty-three, sixty-ﬁve, and sixty-nine.
Figure 12.2displays the empirical retirement hazard for the sample and the
age dummies estimated in the three models. The age dummies in the ac-
crual and peak value models are nearly identical to the empirical hazard,
indicating that these models explain little of the variation across ages in re-
tirement propensities; on the other hand, the age dummies in the option
value model are signiﬁcantly below the empirical hazard.
Being married and having a larger age diﬀerence with one’s wife decrease
the probability of retirement, although only the former is signiﬁcant. More
experience lowers the odds of retirement, conditional on age, but this rela-
tionship is decreasing in absolute value. There is no distinct relationship
with tenure, although there is a very signiﬁcant positive impact of being in
the 6 percent of the sample with missing tenure data; this is consistent with
lower labor force attachment among those in jobs of short duration. The
industry and occupation dummies do not show a particularly strong pat-
tern, with the exception of higher retirement rates in the armed forces and
the cleaning- and building-services occupations. There is no signiﬁcant
time pattern to retirement behavior, which is consistent with Quinn (1999)
who shows that the strong time series trend towards earlier retirement was
arrested beginning in the mid-1980s. There is no strong regional pattern,
other than a higher retirement rate in the western region and a lower rate
in New England.30
The retirement probits for the female sample are shown in table 12.8.
The SSW coeﬃcients are roughly the same size as in the men’s probits and
are signiﬁcant in the accrual and peak value models. As in the men’s pro-
bits, the coeﬃcients on accrual are positive and highly insigniﬁcant. Surpris-
ingly, the results using the forward-looking incentive variables are mixed:
The coeﬃcients on peak value are negative, but small and insigniﬁcant,
while the coeﬃcients on option value are negative and signiﬁcant. One
possible explanation for the insigniﬁcant coeﬃcients is the measurement
error in women’s incentive variables due to a lack of earnings histories for
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29. Only coeﬃcients on age or age dummies are shown in table 12.7.
30. See Coile and Gruber (2000) for a discussion of results incorporating pensions in the re-
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Table 12.8 Retirement Probits, Female Sample
Speciﬁcation
Accrual Peak Value Option Value
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
SSW 0.2619 0.2265 0.2430 0.2169 0.2080 0.1838
(0.1132) (0.1130) (0.1132) (0.1129) (0.1142) (0.1135)
$10,000 changea [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0014]
Incentive measure 0.7727 0.4773 –0.0618 –0.0132 –0.2695 –0.2414
(0.7291) (0.8169) (0.0253) (0.2856) (0.0772) (0.0752)
$1,000 changeb [0.0006] [0.0004] –[0.00005] [–0.00001]
Age 0.1219 0.1217 0.1040
(0.0219) (0.0219) (0.0223)
Age56 0.0223 0.0217 0.0101
(0.0825) (0.0824) (0.0826)
Age57 0.0474 0.0480 0.0312
(0.0960) (0.0959) (0.0961)
Age58 0.1254 0.1268 0.0964
(0.1104) (0.1103) (0.1104)
Age59 0.1186 0.1212 0.0784
(0.1295) (0.1294) (0.1298)
Age60 0.4364 0.4389 0.3811
(0.1415) (0.1414) (0.1422)
Age61 0.4587 0.4632 0.3928
(0.1585) (0.1584) (0.1599)
Age62 1.0015 1.0075 0.9102
(0.1702) (0.1699) (0.1720)
Age63 0.9872 0.9918 0.8721
(0.1939) (0.1937) (0.1966)
Age64 0.8106 0.8119 0.6718
(0.2229) (0.2223) (0.2262)
Age65 1.2619 1.2533 1.0901
(0.2464) (0.2456) (0.2497)
Age66 0.8181 0.8086 0.6318
(0.3377) (0.3371) (0.3406)
Age67 0.2807 0.2714 0.0774
(0.5925) (0.5941) (0.6078)
Age68 0.8993 0.8815 0.6609
(0.5079) (0.5084) (0.5215)
Pseudo R2 0.1418 0.1530 0.1416 0.1530 0.1441 0.1549
Note: See table 12.7.
divorced and deceased spouses; however, this would not explain why op-
tion value is signiﬁcant.31The linear age variable and age dummies are sim-
31. Coile (2003) estimates similar models and ﬁnds that women respond to both peak value
and option value measures. Her sample diﬀers in two ways from the female sample here: First,
she looks only at married women (who may have less measurement error in their incentive
variables than unmarried women) and second, she conditions on working at age ﬁfty or later
(versus ﬁfty-ﬁve here).ilar to those in the men’s model, and again the age dummies from the op-
tion value model are below the empirical hazard (ﬁgure 12.2, panel B). The
pseudo R2 is about 15 percent in all six models.
In summary, SSW has a positive and marginally signiﬁcant eﬀect on re-
tirement behavior for both men and women. The one-year accrual has the
wrong sign and an insigniﬁcant eﬀect, while the forward-looking incen-
tive measures, peak value and option value, have a signiﬁcant negative
eﬀect (although peak value is not signiﬁcant for women). However, the
implications of the estimates that we have presented thus far are diﬃcult
to interpret in a vacuum; are $1,000 changes in peak value considered
large or small? To provide some more context for the magnitudes of our
results, we conduct simulations of changes to the SS system in the follow-
ing section.
12.5 Policy Simulations
In this section, we consider two potential major reforms to the SS sys-
tem. The ﬁrst policy change examined is to raise both the early retirement
age (ERA) and the normal retirement age (NRA) by three years, to sixty-
ﬁve and sixty-eight, respectively. The second policy change is to move from
the current SS system to a common system simulated by all chapters in this
volume: an ERA of sixty and NRA of sixty-ﬁve, a replacement rate of 60
percent of AIME at age sixty-ﬁve, and a 6 percent annual actuarial-
adjustment factor between ages sixty and seventy.
Our basic procedure is to reestimate the incentive variables under the
new policy, then use the probit estimates discussed above to predict
changes in retirement behavior. But executing these simulations raises the
diﬃcult question of how to translate the earlier models into policy re-
sponses. In particular, we face the diﬃculty that our models are largely un-
able to explain the age pattern of retirement, an age pattern that is cer-
tainly at least partly due to SS incentives (in particular the spike at age
sixty-two).
We therefore consider three possible simulation approaches. In the ﬁrst
simulation (S1), we use the model with linear age. This simulation does not
allow for any age-speciﬁc deviations from a linear baseline, therefore in-
creasing the explanatory power of our ﬁnancial incentive variables. In the
second simulation (S2), we use the model with age dummies, but we only
consider the impact of changing the ﬁnancial incentive variables; that is,
when retirement ages change, we only consider the impact that this has
through changing peak or option value, and not through any other struc-
tural shifts. In contrast, the third simulated approach (S3) is also based on
the model in which age dummies are used, but imposes a shift in the spikes
of the retirement hazard when the policy is changed; that is, when retire-
ment ages change, we assume that there is a corresponding change in the
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the assumption that any age pattern not captured by our ﬁnancial mea-
sures is not due to retirement programs; S3 assumes that the entire age pat-
tern is driven by retirement programs. Since it is unknown whether or not
the policy changes would move the spikes in the retirement hazard, S2 and
S3 can be thought of as bounding the true eﬀect of the policy change, with
S1 somewhere in between.
We present our ﬁndings in two formats. Table 12.9shows the baseline av-
erage retirement rate as well as the average retirement rates in the various
policy simulations.33 The second format is graphical. Each of the ﬁgures
12.3–12.11 shows the impact on the hazard of retirement and the cumula-
tive probability of being in the labor force for the baseline and for each of
the two reforms. The diﬀerent ﬁgures correspond to diﬀerent models and
simulations: Figures 12.3–12.5 are for the peak value model for males for
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32. For the ﬁrst policy, all age dummies are incremented by three years, so that the retire-
ment hazard at age sixty-two is moved to age sixty-ﬁve, and so forth. For the second policy,
the age-sixty-two dummy is moved to age sixty, the dummies before age sixty and at ages sixty-
ﬁve and older are unaﬀected, and the age dummies at ages sixty-one to sixty-four are replaced
with an average of the age-sixty-three and -sixty-four dummies. Admittedly, these are ad hoc
adjustments, but it is diﬃcult to predict how these policy changes would aﬀect the underlying
propensity to retire at various ages.
33. Accrual is not used in the simulations, as the coeﬃcients are the wrong sign and in-
signiﬁcant. Peak value is not used in the simulations for women, as the coeﬃcients are highly
insigniﬁcant.
Table 12.9 Average Retirement Rates in Simulations
Simulated Reform
Case Plus 3 Years Common
Males














S3 0.039 0.100simulations S1, S2, and S3; ﬁgures 12.6–12.8 are for the option value model
for males; and ﬁgures 12.9–12.11 are for the option value model for fe-
males.
12.5.1 Raising the ERA and NRA by Three Years
The ﬁrst policy change, raising the ERA and NRA, would have the eﬀect
of lowering the average retirement rate for both men and women. The re-
duction is 1 percentage point or less in S1 and S2, but 2–3 percentage
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A
B
Fig. 12.3 S1 for males, peak value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probabilitypoints under S3. The larger reduction in average retirement rate under S3
is not surprising, as this case moves the spikes in the retirement hazard
back by three years.
We can assess the wealth and accrual eﬀects underlying these results.
This change will have a negative wealth eﬀect on retirement, since this
amounts to a beneﬁt cut for any retirement age, which will encourage work.
The accrual eﬀects are more complicated: For ages sixty-two to sixty-four,
this change will decrease work incentives, as work in these years now only
beneﬁts the individual through the dropout year provision and no longer
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A
B
Fig. 12.4 S2 for males, peak value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probabilitythrough a more than fair actuarial adjustment for delayed claiming; and
for ages sixty-ﬁve to sixty-seven, there will be an increase in work incen-
tives, as the less fair DRC is replaced by the 6.67 percent per year actuar-
ial adjustment. Due to oﬀsetting wealth and accrual eﬀects, there are only
modest eﬀects of this change on labor supply when there is no change in re-
tirement norms; however, when a change in retirement norms is applied,
the labor supply eﬀects will be substantially larger.
The results of these simulations for the ﬁrst policy change are clearly vis-
ible in ﬁgures 12.3–12.11. In each case, for S1, there is relatively little im-
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Fig. 12.5 S3 for males, peak value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probabilitypact on retirement; the simulated pattern of retirement or labor force par-
ticipation closely follows the linear baseline model. Similarly, in S2, there
is little deviation from the baseline; here, the baseline has a nonlinear
shape, as it is allowed to reﬂect variation in the age pattern according to the
model with age dummies. But in S3 there are more signiﬁcant impacts. In-
deed, at age sixty-ﬁve, this policy raises the odds of participating in the
labor force by about one-half from the baseline. For example, for the op-
tion value model, the odds of participating at age sixty-ﬁve rise from 0.46
to 0.68. This is an enormous eﬀect. This eﬀect peaks at age sixty-ﬁve and
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B
Fig. 12.6 S1 for males, option value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probabilitythen fades over time, as retirement is very high under either model at older
ages.
12.5.2 Common Retirement System
The second policy change, moving to a ﬂat 60 percent replacement-
rate beneﬁt with an age sixty early retirement age, has a somewhat diﬀer-
ent pattern of eﬀects. First of all, it signiﬁcantly raises, rather than low-
ering, retirement rates. The policy has the eﬀect of raising both SSW
(from $177,000 to $269,000 for the median man in the sample) and the
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Fig. 12.7 S2 for males, option value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probabilityincentive variables (peak value rises from $13,000 to $35,000 for the me-
dian man). Again, there are oﬀsetting wealth and accrual eﬀects, but here
the wealth eﬀects are much larger and the result is a much higher retire-
ment rate.
The rise in retirement rates for men ranges from 0.7 percentage points in
the peak value model with S2 to 2.6 percentage points for the option value
model with S3. For females, the range is from 2.2 percentage points, with
S2, to 3.4 percentage points, with S3.
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Fig. 12.8 S3 for males, option value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probabilityOnce again, we show the implications for retirement and cumulative la-
bor force participation at each age in ﬁgures 12.3–12.11. In this case, there
are fewer diﬀerences across our modeling and simulation methods: There
is a general ﬁnding of a small rise in the hazard rate at all ages. Unlike the
eﬀects of the ﬁrst reform, which fade over time, these impacts are either
constant or grow at all ages, reﬂecting the fact that this policy does not so
much shift incentives toward earlier retirement as it does raise the wealth
level of retirees at all ages.
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Fig. 12.9 S1 for females, option value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probability12.6 Conclusion
The SS program is the most important source of retirement income sup-
port for older Americans. As such, it is possible that the incentives em-
bodied in this system for continued work or retirement at various ages are
a critical determinant of retirement decisions. Understanding the inﬂu-
ence that SS has on retirement decisions is particularly important now, as
any reforms to the SS system will change the structure of the program in a
manner that has important impacts on retirement incentives.
Our paper has used the richest available current data, the HRS, to pro-
A
B
Fig. 12.10 S2 for females, option value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probability
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Fig. 12.11 S3 for females, option value model: A, simulated hazard; B, cumulative
probability
vide new evidence on the impact of SS on retirement. We ﬁnd that retire-
ment decisions appear to be made with reference to the entire stream of fu-
ture SSW accruals, rather than just the level of wealth or the accrual over
the next year, so that forward-looking measures, such as our peak value
measure, are important variables to include in retirement models. These
forward-looking measures have a signiﬁcant impact on retirement deci-
sions for men, although for women only the option value model gener-
ates signiﬁcant results. Simulations of policy changes indicate that these
changes could have signiﬁcant impacts on retirement decisions. An in-crease in the ERA and NRA could result in a 2 percentage point decrease
in the average annual retirement rate if the increase has the eﬀect of chang-
ing retirement norms, although the eﬀect would be much smaller if norms
are unchanged, due to oﬀsetting wealth and accrual eﬀects. A move to a
policy with a 60 percent replacement rate at age sixty-ﬁve, a much more
generous policy than the current SS system, would have very large wealth
eﬀects, raising the average annual retirement rate by 2–3 percentage points.
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